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The astonishing rise of the group Islamic State of Iraq and as-Sham 
(ISIS*), which has been as brutal as it has been quick, has funda-
mentally altered the political landscapes of Syria and Iraq and forced 
more than a million civilians from their homes. The International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM) estimates that approximately 1.7 
million Iraqis have been displaced in 2014.1 This does not include 
the 217,000 Syrians already taking refuge there when the year began. 
The vast majority of affected Iraqis have so far remained internally 
displaced persons (IDPs), moving repeatedly within and between 
provinces to escape the shifting violence. The IOM further estimates 
that nearly half of these IDPs are taking shelter in the Autonomous 
Kurdish Region (KR-I). This is where the vast majority of Syrian 
refugees are located as well. A small number of Iraqis have become 
refugees by crossing into Jordan, Turkey, and even Syria in search of 
succour.
This brief situates what is happening today within Iraq’s much larger 
history of violent displacement. Looking across the past 35 years, it 
argues that ISIS may be distinct inasmuch as it has taken and held terri-
tory from Syria and Iraq, thereby successfully challenging colonial-
1. Dooley, E. (2014) ‘Obama says US will “degrade and ultimately defeat” ISIS 
like Al Qaeda’, ABC News, 5. Sept, http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/presi-
dent-obama-us-degrade-ultimately-defeat-isis-al/story?id=25261946
* ISIS, sometimes called ISIL, is also known by its Arabic acronym Da’ish, 
which stands for Ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fī al-‘Irāq wa ash-shām. ISIS recent-
ly shortened its name to ‘Islamic State’, but this article uses ISIS as it is more 
familiar to English-speaking audiences.
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era borders. Its violence is furthermore ‘non-state’ 
and it espouses a radically retrogressive ideology. 
But even though some of its tactics differ from those 
of earlier aggressors, it is neither unique in its level 
of brutality nor is it an unprecedented threat to the 
well-being of Iraqi citizens. It is important to maintain 
this perspective as Western governments expand their 
offensive against the group over the coming months. 
ISIS’ goals, structure and fighting ability make it a 
difficult enemy to either appease or neutralise. As 
such, it remains unclear whether military action can 
effectively “degrade and ultimately defeat ISI(S)”, as 
US President Obama vowed to do on 5 September.2 
What is certain, however, is that recourse to either 
aerial bombardment or ground troops, as unlikely as 
the latter seems at the moment, will further increase 
Iraq’s IDP and refugee populations.
This report also discusses the evolution and expan-
sion of ISIS, as well as the human displacement it has 
caused. It demonstrates that the nature of the move-
ments is anything but random. Sunnis, Christians 
and Yazidis are fleeing north into the KR-I, while 
Shi’a are heading toward their southern heartlands. 
The longer this keeps up, the more striking will be 
the changes to Iraq’s ethnic and religious geography. 
Finally, this report seeks to reminds readers that, 
when it comes to the plight of IDPs and refugees, 
old problems have not been solved simply because 
new problems have begun. Whether within Iraq 
or in neighbouring countries, the latest violence 
adds a new layer of victims on top of pre-existing, 
protracted refugee and IDP populations. The Euro-
pean response, if it is to address the full problem of 
displacement in Iraq, cannot be limited to those scat-
tered by the ISIS advance. As big as even that task is, 
to do so would be to further forget those extremely 
2. Dooley, E. (2014) ‘Obama says US will “degrade and ul-
timately defeat” ISIS like Al Qaeda’, ABC News, 5. Sept, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-us-de-
grade-ultimately-defeat-isis-al/story?id=25261946
vulnerable individuals whose plight has been super-
seded in the headlines by the seemingly never-
ending string of crises afflicting our world today.
Constant Violence, Recurring 
Displacement
The violent displacement of individuals and commu-
nities has been a near-constant feature of Iraq for at 
least the past 35 years. Indeed, under Saddam Hussein 
(president 1979-2003) forced displacement was a 
well-used tool for achieving political and economic 
ends.3 During the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 
1980-1988, there was widespread flight of Shi’a and 
other political dissidents to Syria and elsewhere.4 
The Shi’a, due to their shared religion with Iran and 
despite the loyalty Shi’i soldiers demonstrated during 
the war, were easily portrayed as a fifth column and 
tens of thousands were deported to Iran by Saddam’s 
regime.5
The Iraqi state was, in parallel to its conflict with 
Iran, fighting the nationalist aspirations of Iraqi 
Kurds. The Ba’athist regime systematically targeted 
Kurdish areas throughout the war to repress 
demands for Kurdish autonomy and retaliate against 
Iranian-backed, Kurdish militants. “Between 1980 
and 1988, the Ba’ath regime destroyed some 4,000 
villages, displacing up to a million people, and evis-
cerating rural Iraqi Kurdistan.”6 The coup de grâce in 
anti-Kurdish fighting was the 1986-1988 Al-Anfal 
campaign, which ended with over 100,000 Kurdish 
dead and hundreds of thousands forced from their 
3. Fawcett, J. & Tanner, V. (2002), ‘The Internally Displaced 
People of Iraq’, Brookings.
4. Al Khalidi, A.; Hoffman, S. and Tanner, V. (2007) ‘Iraqi 
refugees in the Syrian Arab Republic: A field-based snap-
shot’, Brookings, p. 9.
5. Romano (2005), ‘Whose house is this anyway? IDP and 
refugee return in post-Saddam Iraq’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies, 18(4), p.432.
6. Fawcett and Tanner (2002), p.9.
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homes, “forbidden to return to their villages of origin 
on pain of death.”7
The Iran-Iraq war resulted in non-victories for both 
sides. Seeking a consolation prize of sorts, Ba’athist 
generals sent their army into Kuwait in August 1990. 
This precipitated Operation Desert Storm in January 
1991, resulting in thousands of Iraqi deaths as well 
as the institution of a punitive financial and trade 
embargo that lasted until 2003. At the same time, 
and in no small part due to the America’s promise 
of support, both Kurds and Shi’a rose in rebellion 
against the Ba’athist state. This promise did not 
materialise, and coalition forces stood aside while 
the Iraqi military ferociously countered both upris-
ings. In the north, an estimated 1.5 million Kurds 
7. ‘The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds’, Human Rights 
Watch (1993). http://www.hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqan-
fal/ANFALINT.htm
entered Iran, while half a million more found them-
selves trapped on the northern border after Turkish 
military barred them entry. Turkish intransigence 
moved the West to institute a no-fly zone against all 
Iraqi airpower in Kurdish areas.8 However govern-
ment efforts to expel Kurds from certain areas, as 
part of a concerted programme of ‘Arabisation’, 
continued until American forces returned in 2003.9
The Shi’a intifada (uprising) across southern Iraq 
in March 1991 was likewise crushed. When the 
remnants of the opposition fled into Iraq’s southern 
marshes, the state used it as a pretext to drain the 
marshes and purge the area of its Shi’a inhabitants. 
“Iraqi security forces used napalm and other chem-
ical weapons, shelled and burned villages, assassi-
nated local leaders … and abducted heads of families. 
8. Fawcett and Tanner (2002), p.10
9. Romano (2005), p.432.
Figure 1: Iraqi Refugee Applications Received in Top 4 Receivers (1985-2013)
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Other tactics … included the deliberate contamina-
tion of water supplies, the poisoning of the fishing 
grounds, commercial blockades, [and] the denial of 
aid.”10 In targeted areas those who were not killed 
were expelled, the villages were razed, and the ground 
laced was with mines to prevent return.11 Much like 
the standing state policy of aggression against the 
Kurds in the north, attacks against Shi’a in the south 
continued into 2002. By the end of Saddam’s rule, 
the total population in the area had dropped by a 
factor of 10 from an estimated population 250,000 in 
1990 to 25,000 a decade later.12 Brookings estimated 
that around 300,000, predominantly Shi’i individ-
uals remained displaced in South/Central Iraq and 
around 600,000 IDPs were in the Kurdish north on 
the eve of the 2003 American invasion.13 
Saddam-era repression and crippling sanctions 
furthermore pushed hundreds of thousands of indi-
viduals out of the country. While reliable numbers 
are hard to come by, one widely-cited paper esti-
mated that more than half a million Iraqis lived in 
neighbouring countries in 2002: around 300,000 in 
Jordan, 200,000 in Iran, 40,000 in Syria, and 5,000 
in Saudi Arabia.14 Europe also received a steady and 
increasing stream of Iraqi refugees from the 1980s 
onward. The four main receiving countries of Iraqi 
asylum seekers in Europe – Germany, Sweden, the 
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom – logged 
225,000 asylum applications from Iraqi nationals 
between 1985 and 2002. Indeed, Europe-wide the 
highest levels of Iraqi asylum applicants in the past 
30 years (40,000+ across the EU27) were registered 
10. Fawcett and Tanner (2002), p.31
11. Romano (2005), p.432
12. Fawcett and Tanner (2002), p.33
13. Fawcett and Tanner (2002), p.33, 16. Estimates were made 
using US Committee for Refugees data
14. USRC (2002), cited in Romano (2005), p. 435
in 2001 and 2002, before the American invasion took 
place (See Figure 1).15 
American invasion, insurgency, and 
internecine fighting
To the surprise of many, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by 
the US and its allies did not, at least initially, trigger 
a massive outpouring of refugees into neighbouring 
countries.16 Limited numbers of refugees returned 
to Iraq and some attempts were made resettle the 
‘old caseload’ of pre-2003 IDPs. However, previous 
Ba’athist Arabisation policies had not only cleansed 
areas of certain populations but resettled them with 
others. Returnees thus often found themselves living 
in tents or creating new IDPs, with one displaced 
family displacing another.17
Conditions deteriorated as the occupation dragged 
on. Disaffected Iraqis, predominantly Sunnis caught 
on the losing end of a power swing toward Iraq’s 
majority Shi’a population, as well as foreign fighters 
attacked American troops with increasing intensity. 
American and coalition soldiers fought back, and 
their capacity for inflicting violence as the occupying 
power was a main driver of displacement in the 2000s.
Sunni militants also attacked Shi’a population centres 
and symbols. Events came to a head in early 2006, 
when Sunni militants bombed the Al-Askari Shrine 
in Samarra, one of the holiest Shi’i monuments in 
the world. “Shi’a militiamen, mostly from the Mahdi 
Army, responded with stunning violence, storming 
through Sunni neighbourhoods in Baghdad and 
elsewhere, randomly slaughtering Sunni residents, 
torching Sunni businesses and defiling Sunni 
15. Eurostat. Data for Sweden (1995; 1996; 2002), Netherlands 
(2002) and Germany (1985-1996) taken from the respec-
tive national statistics bureaus
16. Al-Khalidi et al. (2007), p.5
17. Romano (2005), p. 436
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mosques. That, in turn, lead to yet more retribution 
against Shi’a civilians by radical Sunni militias.”18
The cycle of violence quickened over the following 
months. Iraq in 2006-7 saw the daylight executions 
of civilians, the torching of neighbourhoods, and 
an estimated daily average of 30-40 kidnappings in 
Baghdad alone.19 Sunni extremists in some areas also 
demanded that Christians convert, pay jizya (a tax 
on non-Muslims that has not been used in the area 
since the Ottomans abolished it in the 19th century), 
or die.20 ISIS – the direct descendent of Al-Qaeda in 
Iraq – would repeat this demand in 2014.21 
18. Al Khalidi et al. (2007), p.6
19.  Al Khalidi et al. (2007), p.7
20.  Al-Khalidi et al. (2007), p.13
21. Evans, D. and al-Rube’i, I. (2014) ‘Convert, pay tax, or die, 
Islamic State warns Christians’, Reuters, 18 July. http://
www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/18/us-iraq-security-
christians-idUSKBN0FN29J20140718
Iraqis fled en masse, creating the refugee crisis every-
body had feared would happen when the invasion 
began. Humanitarian actors at the time assumed 
that 2 million were displaced within Iraq and an 
additional 2 million were living, often unregistered, 
as refugees in neighbouring countries. The Norwe-
gian Research Institute FAFO concluded in May 
2007 that 162,000 Iraqis were in Jordan, but later 
revised that number upward, somewhat dubiously, 
to a shade less than half a million.22 The Danish 
Research Council put the number in Lebanon at 
between 26,000-50,000 for the same year.23 A 2008 
statistical survey from the American University in 
Cairo concluded that 17,000 Iraqis were residing in 
22. FAFO (2007), ‘Iraqis in Jordan: Their number and charac-
teristics’, p. 3
23. DRC, ‘Iraqi Population Survey in Lebanon’, November 
2007, p.10
Figure 2: Iraqi Asylum Applications to EU27 by Country and by Year (2003-2013)
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Egypt.24 The remainder – some 1.5 million – were 
commonly assumed to be in Syria, but Iraqis there 
were never counted and that number now appears to 
have been greatly exaggerated.25 
Over-estimates aside, the movement of Iraqis in 
2006 and 2007 was still the largest displacement the 
Middle East had seen since 1948, a title which has 
now been passed onto the Syrian crisis.26 With the 
sole exception of 2004, European Member States 
24. Fargues, P.; El-Masry, S.; Sadek, S. and Shaban, A. (2008) 
‘Iraqis in Egypt: A Statistical Survey in 2008’, The Ameri-
can University in Cairo
25. P. Fargues (2013) ‘International Migration and the Nation 
State in Arab Countries’ Middle East Law and Govern-
ance, 5, 5–35, p.26-29
26. Harper, A. ‘Iraq’s refugees: Ignored and unwanted’, In-
ternational Review of the Red Cross, p.169; Syrian refugee 
numbers come from UNHCR and IDP estimates from the 
latest SHARP plan from the UN
have received no less than 10,000 new asylum 
applications from Iraqis annually since the Ameri-
cans entered in 2003. Applications, which may only 
be filed by people who have entered EU territory, 
peaked at nearly 39,000 applications in 2007 (See 
Figure 2).27 Cumulatively, this has resulted in more 
than 180,000 asylum applications being filed by 
Iraqi citizens to EU Member States since 2003, with 
most going to Sweden (48,000), Germany (47,000), 
the Netherlands (23,000) and the United Kingdom 
(16,000) (See Figure 2). Only around one-quarter of 
these were accepted between 2003-2005. The rate of 
acceptance picked up as conditions worsened over 
the decade. Since 2006 the positive decision rate for 
Iraqi asylum applications has fluctuated between 
45% and 60%, according to data from Eurostat.
27. Eurostat. Data accessed 13 October 2014
Figure 3a: Registered Syrian Refugee Populations in Neighbouring Countries
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The Syria crisis and the rise of ISIS
The Syrian crisis began in March 2011 with rela-
tively modest refugee flows, but as the fighting got 
worse the pace of the flight quickened. It is now the 
biggest displacement crisis ever seen in the Middle 
East. UNHCR had registered just 40,000 refugees 
in neighbouring countries one year into the crisis. 
Syrian refugees had topped 1 million 12 months after 
that. The most recent figures for mid-October 2014 
show three million people registered in five neigh-
bouring countries, some 214,000 of which are in Iraq 
(See Figure 3a). EU Member States, in contrast, have 
received a comparatively modest amount of Syrians. 
Slightly less than 124,000 Syrian asylum applications 
were filed between January 2011 and July 2014, or 
2,700 a month. Of these, 63% were filed in Germany 
and Sweden (See Figure 3b).28
The Syrian civil war, the root cause of the refugee 
crisis, has been joined by many factions. On one side 
stands the Syrian regime, its quasi-reserve army/
militia the National Defense Force, its Lebanese ally 
Hezbollah, as well as several smaller groups. On the 
other stands myriad, often competing opposition 
groups. Major players include, inter alia: the Free 
Syria Army, Syria’s ‘secular’ opposition backed by the 
United States; Islamic Front, a coalition of groups 
including Liwa at-Tawhid, the Muslim Brotherhood 
affiliate that is the main opposition in Aleppo; Jabhat 
an-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syria branch; and ISIS.
ISIS has its origins in America’s 2003 adventure in 
Iraq. The brainchild of Abu Musab az-Zarqawi, it 
28. Eurostat. Data accessed 13 October 2014
Figure 3b: Syrian Asylum Applicants to EU27
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was founded shortly after the American invasion as 
Jama’at al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad. It quickly rose to noto-
riety after it aligned itself with Osama bin Laden, 
changed its name to Al-Qaeda in Iraq, and made the 
Shi’a their target of choice. Az-Zarqawi was killed by 
American bombs in 2006, but the group survived. By 
the time war broke out in Syria it had changed its name 
to Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) and was commanded by 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, now the self-styled caliph 
of Islamic State. ISI’s fighting force was strongly 
bolstered by the former commanders and soldiers 
of Saddam’s military, many of whom had been 
co-opted by the Americans only a few years earlier 
to fight against Al-Qaeda in Iraq. They switched 
Figure 4: ISIS Presence in Iraq and Syria, as of 19 August 2014
ISIS Presence
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Source: Syria Needs Analysis Project (SNAP), ACAPS
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sides when they found themselves sidelined by the 
Shi’i al-Maliki government, which had no intention 
of sharing power with its former tormentors (see 
above), after the American withdrawal in 2011.29
Al-Baghdadi declared the formation of Islamic State 
of Iraq and as-Sham in April 2013 as a deliberate 
expansionary project to involve his group in Syria.30 
ISIS now maintains a strong presence in the eastern 
provinces of ar-Raqqa, al-Hasakah, and Deir az-Zor. 
It has captured wide swaths of territory, and in doing 
so effectively erased much of Iraq’s western border 
with Syria at least for the duration of its dominance 
there. The group’s capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second 
largest city, on 9 June and the declaration of a cali-
phate with Al-Baghdadi as caliph marks the culmi-
nation of this campaign (See Figure 4).
No longer affiliated with al-Qaeda, ISIS is one of the 
most extreme and brutal factions fighting today. The 
western-backed Free Syrian Army and al-Qaeda’s 
Jabhat an-Nusra, as well as myriad other groups, 
have made common cause against it since the begin-
ning of the year. Over the summer they largely 
succeeded in expelling ISIS from most of Syria’s 
northwest provinces. It is now resurgent there, and 
ISIS fighting in Kobane, Syria above Aleppo recently 
sent an estimated 130,000 Syrian Kurds across the 
Turkish border in 96 hours (18-22 Sept.).31 
Since this time Iraqi civilians and Western audiences 
alike have been treated to a never-ending saga of 
atrocity, cruelty, and murder. ISIS celebrated its lead-
er’s coronation by demanding that religious minori-
29. Ghosh, B. (2014) ‘ISIS: A short history’, The Atlantic, 14 Aug. 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/
isis-a-short-history/376030
30. ‘ISI Confirms That Jabhat Al-Nusra Is Its Extension In 
Syria, Declares ‘Islamic State Of Iraq And Al-Sham’ As 
New Name Of Merged Group’, MEMRI, April 8 2013. 
http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/7119.htm
31. ‘Syrian Kurds ‘halt ISIL push’ near Turkey’, Al Jazeera, 22 Sept 
2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/09/
syrian-kurds-isil-kobane-201492285029457801.html
ties in Mosul convert, leave, pay the jizya tax (see 
above), or be put to the sword. They had 24 hours 
to comply.32 They followed this by putting thousands 
of Yazidis under siege atop Mt. Sinjar, a barren slope 
without water or food, for a week in early August. 
Most recently, the beheadings of American jour-
nalists James Foley (19 August) and Steven Sotloff 
(2 Sept.), as well as British aid workers David 
Haines (14 Sept.) and Alan Henning (3 Oct.), have 
confronted Western audiences with ISIS’s porno-
graphic violence as never before. Yet as horrific as 
each of these events are, they do not capture the scale 
or longevity of Iraq’s chronic crisis of violence and 
displacement.
IDPs and refugees in Iraq today
The fighting of the past year is but a new act in Iraq’s 
seemingly endless instability and displacement. 
UNHCR estimated that prior to January 2014, when 
ISIS fighters made their debut by wresting control of 
Fallujah from the Iraqi security forces,33 Iraq already 
housed 1.13 million IDPs who had been displaced 
during the 2006-08 fighting.34 It was also giving 
shelter to some 217,000 registered Syrian refugees, 
the vast majority of whom are ethnically Kurdish 
and some 96% have sought shelter in the Autono-
mous Kurdistan Region (KR-I).35
The International Organisation for Migration (IOM) 
attempts to monitor the movements of IDPs in Iraq 
32. Rubin, A. (2014). ‘ISIS Forces Last Iraqi Christians to Flee 
Mosul’, The New York Times, 18 July. http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/07/19/world/middleeast/isis-forces-last-iraqi-
christians-to-flee-mosul.html
33. ‘Iraq government loses control of Fallujah’, Al Jazeera 
English, 4 January 2014. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2014/01/iraq-government-loses-control-fallu-
jah-20141414625597514.html
34. ‘UNHCR concerned as sectarian violence in Iraq threat-
ens new internal displacement’, UNHCR, 24 Sept. 2013. 
http://www.unhcr.org/print/5241644c9.html
35. UNHCR
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using its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM). The 
DTM36 relies on community leaders, local authori-
ties, security forces, government registration data, 
36. For more information on the International Organisation 
for Migration’s Displacement Tracking Matrix in Iraq, as 
well as access to the data, see: http://iomiraq.net/dtm-page
and other agencies to identify IDP locations. When 
the security situation permits, field teams survey the 
IDPs to understand their profile, movement history, 
shelter, and basic needs. This makes the information 
provided by the DTM necessarily incomplete, but 
it is the best data available for a population notori-
Figure 5: IDP Movements in Iraq by Province of Origin and Destination, (as of 19 August 2014)
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ously hard to track. This paper references DTM data 
released 28 August. The reader should note that, as 
neither are all IDP locations known nor are they able 
to be continuously monitored, discussion of DTM 
data and its visual depiction in Figure 5 can only 
refer to the province of origin and current location 
for IDPs on this date. It does not capture the many 
intermediary steps experienced by those forced to 
move repeatedly in order to stay out of harm’s way.
The DTM estimates slightly less than 1.7 million 
new people have been displaced since January 2014 
across nearly 1600 locations.37 The composition 
of the displaced includes people from all religions, 
sects, ethnicities and socio-economic classes. Thus 
while certain patterns of movement are linked to 
the profile of individual IDPs, and although ISIS 
claims to follow Sunni Islam, ISIS violence is not one 
‘category’ of people punishing another. It is a polit-
ical project that targets anybody who does not (or 
cannot) conform to it, regardless of their religious or 
ethnic affiliations.
Nearly all IDPs (93%, some 1.5 million people) come 
from the three provinces where the ISIS hammer has 
hit hardest: Ninevah (49%), Anbar (29%), and Sala-
huddin (15%). Patterns of movement within these 
provinces differ. Two-thirds of IDPs from Anbar 
have circulated within the province. In contrast, 90% 
of those displaced in Ninevah and Salahuddin have 
fled their provinces of origin (See Figure 5). A small 
number have reportedly escaped to Jordan, while 
others have crossed into Syria’s al-Hasakeh province, 
itself a site of violence38 The turmoil is spreading, 
and fighting in both countries continues to generate 
new IDPs with few good options.
37. Using the 1 Sept. 2014 round of the DTM-Iraq. The DTM 
is the best data we have at the moment, but IOM fully 
admits that security concerns and multiple movements 
make it necessarily incomplete.
38. ‘Iraq Displacement Profile’, ACAPS, 4 July 2014
An estimated 750,000 Iraqis, a little less than half the 
entire population of 2014 IDPs, have found their way 
to the Autonomous Kurdish Region (KR-I). They are 
technically classified as IDPs as they have not left 
Iraq. However this inaccurately describes their situ-
ation, as KR-I security forces operate border controls 
for non-Kurds and issue short-term visas at their 
discretion. They are thus in many ways closer to 
refugees than IDPs, and “ironically, Syrians … hold a 
clearer legal status, as they receive a residency permit 
after registering with the UN agency.”39
This tenuous legal situation is exacerbated by a 
lack of humanitarian programmes in KR-I geared 
specifically for dealing with IDPs. The programmes 
that exist were designed to meet the needs of Syrian 
refugees, and to date there is no systematic way to 
handle IDPs in KR-I or Iraq more generally. Indeed, 
the Iraqi government in Baghdad has shown neither 
ability nor interest in ameliorating the suffering of its 
displaced citizens. 
The directions of flight in Iraq are not random. 
Breaking down the movements by ethnicity and 
religious group reveals that a type of ethno-religious 
cleansing or consolidation is taking place in Iraq 
today (see Figure 6). On the one hand, Sunni Arabs 
from Anbar and Salahuddin who have left their prov-
ince of origin have moved north and east to KR-I 
(27%), Kirkuk (12%), and Baghdad (9%). Kirkuk, 
while not in KR-I proper, is claimed by the Kurdish 
authorities and has a strong Kurdish military pres-
ence. They are joined by around 372,000 Iraqi Kurds, 
91% of whom are Yazidi. Nearly all of them come 
from Ninevah province. Of these, 81% have fled 
north to Dohuk while another 17% have remained 
in Ninevah, accounting for nearly the entire Kurdish 
IDP population of 2014. The estimated 56,000 Chris-
tians that have been forced from their homes have, 
39. Hoffmann, Sophia (2014) ‘Nowhere to turn for Mosul’s 
refugees’, MERIP, July 15. http://www.merip.org/no-
where-turn-mosuls-refugees
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almost without exception, gone to KR-I and Kirkuk 
as well.
Shi’a are in contrast heading south. Some 83% 
(178,000 individuals) have gone to a province south 
of Baghdad, even though nearly all of them origi-
nated from Ninevah, a province directly bordering 
Dohuk and farther north than Anbar. In doing so, 
they are reversing Saddam-era policies of Arabisa-
tion that transplanted many Shi’a from the south into 
Iraq’s northern provinces (see above). This was done 
to counter Kurdish dominance in the north while 
weakening southern Shi’a communities at the same 
Figure 6: IDP Movements in Iraq by Religious Group (as of 19 August 2014)
Movements of less than 10,000 people not shown.
Hooked arrows singal displacement within a province of origin.
The Autonomous Kurdish Region (KR-I) is shaded in blue.
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time.40 The longer this pattern of movement lasts, the 
more marked will be the change to Iraq’s ethnic and 
religious demographics. Kurdish areas will have a 
more pronounced Sunni Arab presence, while Shi’a 
populations will be even more concentrated in the 
south than they already were.
Responding to an uncertain future
The recent beheadings of Westerners, and the 
promise of more to come, have spurred Western 
government officials into demanding a more forceful 
response. Yet it is unclear how much military action 
will be able to accomplish in terms of peace and 
stability. What is certain is that as long as the bombs 
drop, and as long as ISIS rapes, tortures, enslaves, 
and persecutes its way through its ‘caliphate’ project, 
people will continue to run.
40. Romano (2005), p. 432
Concern for the continued suffering of Iraq’s IDPs 
is, however, in danger of being overshadowed by the 
military intervention as well as a growing fear that 
ISIS is a threat to Western nations. This has shifted 
some donors, especially the American and British 
governments, to speak more in military than human-
itarian terms. Aid to IDPs is also threatened by 
palpable donor fatigue. The UN Strategic Response 
Plan for Iraq originally requested $312 million in 
humanitarian aid to respond to the IDP crisis in 
Iraq today. To date OCHA reports that donations 
total some $771 million, an incredible 2.5 times the 
original requested amount.41 As heartening as that 
seems, parsing the data reveals that 65% of this has 
come from Saudi Arabia, which has donated $500 
million in humanitarian aid to Iraq this year. The 
41. ‘Iraq 2014: List of all humanitarian pledges, commitments 
& contributions in 2014’, Financial Tracking Service, OCHA, 
Accessed: 25 Sept. 2014. http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.
aspx?page=emerg-emergencyDetails&appealID=983
Figure 7: Top Humanitarian Aid Donors to Iraq in 2014
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United States, the second largest donor, has given 
$87.5 million, even while it is estimated to have spent 
ten times that amount bombing ISIS.42 The European 
Union has so far donated $113 million to Iraq: $90 
million from Member States and $23 million from 
the European Commission (See Figure 7). Without 
Saudi Arabia’s largess, OCHA would not yet have 
met its original funding goal, let alone surpassed it.
Iraq has known 35 years of displacement, not least 
because of Western military adventures in the region. 
Until the time comes when people caught up in 
fighting can return to a normal life, if not their orig-
inal location, they cannot be left along the wayside.
42. ‘Estimating the cost of operations against ISIL’, Centre 
for Strategic and Budgetary Asessments, Sept 2014. http://
www.csbaonline.org/publications/2014/09/estimating-
the-cost-of-operations-against-isil/
